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MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS
AND THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
Abrahams v. Civil Service Commission, 65 N.J. 61,319 A.2d 483
(1974)
Appellant, a stenographer, was dismissed from the law department of
the city of Newark because her residence outside the city violated the
municipal employee residence ordinance.' She appealed to the Civil
Service Commission, alleging that the ordinance unconstitutionally re-
stricted her right to travel. The Commission dismissed her appeal, and
review by the Appellate Division was certified to the Supreme Court of
New Jersey,2 which affirmed the Commission order and held: The Ne-
wark ordinance requiring municipal employees to reside within the city
did not unconstitutionally penalize the exercise of the right to travel.8
The majority of cities and counties in the United States impose resi-
dence requirements upon their employees. 4 Such requirements do not
violate the equal protection clause under the traditional standard of re-
view-whether the requirement is reasonably related to a legitimate
state interest.5 Such municipal employee residence requirements, how-
1. Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 85-86 n.4, 319 A.2d 483, 496 n.4
(1974) (dissenting opinion); Brief for Appellant at 1, Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
supra, citing Nnw.nK, N.J., REv. ORDINANCES § 2:14-1.
2. Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comnm'n, 63 NJ. 561, 310 A.2d 476 (1973).
3. Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 NJ. 61, 319 A.2d 483 (1974). Two
other issues determined by the court will not be discussed in this Comment: (1)
whether the "special circumstances" exemption to the ordinance, unanimously deter-
mined to be unconstitutionally vague, was severable; and (2) whether uniform enforce-
ment within one department of the city but nonenforcement in all other departments
constituted discriminatory enforcement and was a violation of equal protection.
4. Goldstein, Residency Requirements for Municipal Employees: Denial of a
Right to Commute?, 7 U.S.F.L. REy. 508, 511 n.11 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Gold-
stein].
5. E.g., Kennedy v. City of Newark, 29 NJ. 178, 148 A.2d 473 (1959); Gould
v. Bennett, 153 Misc. 818, 276 N.Y.S. 113 (Sup. Ct. 1934); see McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); Flemming v. Nester, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
Some of the interests which a court may hold to be furthered by employee residence
are ethnic balance, reduction of unemployment, minority relations, employee involve-
ment with the community, administrative efficiency, availability of trained manpower in
emergencies, and local salary expenditure. Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d 129,
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ever, cannot meet the stringent "compelling state interest' standard of
review.6 Constitutional attacks on such ordinances have been infre-
quent7 since there seemed to be no rationale requiring application of the
compelling state interest standard. This rationale may have been provid-
ed, however, by recent decisions requiring application of that standard
to classifications that infringe the constitutional right to travel.8 The
constitutionality of municipal employee residence requirements de-
pends, therefore, on whether the compelling state interest standard of
review is appropriate, which in turn depends on whether such residence
requirements infringe the right to travel.
Although the right to travel interstate was guaranteed by the Articles
of Confederation,9 it received no direct mention in the Constitution.
Rather, it is one of the penumbral rights that have become clearly estab-
lished only through judicial interpretation of elastic constitutional claus-
es.1 The cases, however, have not determined definitively the clause or
clauses from which the right is derived.'- Prior to 1969, each case up-
514 P.2d 433, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973). For a case holding a municipal employee
residence ordinance unreasonable, see State Employees Local 339 v. City of Highland
Park, 363 Mich. 79, 108 N.W.2d 898 (1961) (ordinance required residence in city even
though adequate accommodations were not available).
6. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting):
So far as I am aware, no state law has ever satisfied this seemingly insurmount-
able standard, and I doubt one ever will, for it demands nothing less than per-
fection.
But see Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972).
7. Employees, however, frequently have argued on technical grounds that residence
requirements did not, or should not, apply to them. Goldstein 511 n.12, 512 n.13 (cases
collected).
8. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); cases cited note 19 infra.
9. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV:
r[]he people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to and from any
other state, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce,
subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants
thereof respectively..
10. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
I1. In early cases, the right of a citizen of one state to pass through or reside in
any other state was said to be one of the privileges and immunities guaranteed by U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 2. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1871); Paul
v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552
(No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). See also Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97
(1908); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873). Other cases stated
that the right of interstate travel was derived from the commerce clause. Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1868)
(concurring opinion); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849). The privileges
or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment has been suggested as another source.
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holding the right to travel involved a direct and obvious infringement.
Thus, a tax imposed by a state on individuals leaving the state was held
constitutionally impermissible as contrary to the most basic concepts of
federalism.' 2 A statute criminalizing the act of bringing an indigent into
the state was also held unconstitutional "under any known test of the
validity of State interference with interstate commerce.""' The refusal to
issue a passport, however, was upheld by balancing the extent of the
restriction on travel against the necessity for the restriction.' 4
In 1969, Shapiro v. Thompson'5 held that the right to travel was a
fundamental right that might not be infringed without a demonstration
of a compelling state interest.1 6 Shapiro struck down a state requirement
Edwards v. California, supra at 181, 183-85 (Douglas & Jackson, JJ., concurring); Twin-
ing v. New Jersey, supra at 97. See also Crandall v. Nevada, supra at 43-44, 48-49 (ma-
jority opinion). One decision held the right to be implicit in the creation of a national
government Id. The right of a United States citizen to travel outside of the country
is protected by the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S.
1, 14 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-06 (1964); Kent v. Dul-
les, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).
12. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868).
13. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 174 (1941).
14. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). But refusal to issue a passport because of
the political associations of the recipient was held unconstitutional, since first amend-
ment rights were also involved. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964);
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
15. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
16. The compelling state interest test Was created in a rather speculative footnote
to a decision using the rational basis test. The note indicated that a more stringent
standard may be applicable when legislation appears on its face to be prohibited by the
Constitution, or when it restricts "those political processes which can ordinarily be ex-
pected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation," or when it is a product of "preju-
dice against discrete and insular minorities." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). The test has since developed into the cornerstone of the
"new" equal protection, and is used in two kinds of cases. First, classifications based
upon certain criteria are inherently suspect and require demonstration of a compelling
interest in order to be sustained. E.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973)
(alienage); Loving v. Virginia, '388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (nationality). Secondly, classifications which impinge upon cer-
tain fundamental, constitutionally protected rights require a showing of compelling in-
terest. E.g., Kramer V. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (classification
restricting right to vote in special election to parents of local public school children or
property owners); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right of procreation in-
fringed by classification under which persons committing grand larceny are sterilized but
embezzlers are not); cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (right to free exercise
of religion of Seventh Day Adventist infringed by denial of unemployment compensation
for failure to accept employment on Saturdays); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960)
(teacher's right of association infringed by requiring affidavit listing all organizations
Washington University Open Scholarship
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that an individual applying for welfare aid must have been a resident of
the state for at least one year. The Court pointed out that a durational
residence requirement divides welfare applicants into two groups distin-
guishable only on the basis of recent interstate movement.17 Since the
requirement infringed the right to travel by denying the basic means of
to which teacher belonged or contributed within past five years). Shapiro falls in the
second category, and thus the Court stated:
Since the classification here touches on the fundamental right -of interstate
movement, its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of
whether it promotes a compelling State interest.
394 U.S. at 638 (emphasis original).
Incantations of "suspect classifications" and "fundamental rights" have led to mechan-
ical application of the compelling state interest standard in the state and lower federal
courts, even when the underlying public policy grounds which provide the rationale for
disregarding the legislative judgment have not been present. E.g., irinting Indus. v.
Hill, 382 F. Supp. 801, 807-11 (S.D. Tex.), prob. juris. noted, 95 S. Ct. 677 (1974)
(statute requiring political advertising to state name of printer held unconstitutional un-
der compelling state interest test); Sturrup v. Mahan, - Ind. App. -, 290 N.E.2d 64
(1972), modified, - Ind. App. -, 305 N.E.2d 877 (1974) (high school athletic as-
sociation requirement that student must attend school within district where his parents
reside in order to be eligible for varsity athletics subjected to compelling interest test as
restriction on right to travel, and found unconstitutional). Such automatic application
of the stringent standard has led to dissatisfaction with the compelling interest/rational
basis dichotomy. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HAnv. L. REv. 1, 15-24 (1972).
The problem could be resolved in one of three ways. First, the Supreme Court could
declare that the compelling interest standard is not to be extended to any new factual
situation without a full evaluation of the reasons for ignoring the legislative judgment-
a return to the standards suggested by the Carolene Products footnote. Cf. White Motor
Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) (established similar policy with regard to
extension of per se rule of antitrust law). Secondly, the Court could recognize that in
reality no dichotomy exists and that its
decisions in the field of equal protection defy such easy categorization. . . .
[This Court] has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination
allegedly violative of the Equal Protection Clause.
San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing). Such recognition would result in overt use of a balancing test. Town of Milton
v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, - Mass. -, -, 312 N.E.2d 188, 195 (1974). Finally, the
Court could approve lower court decisions purporting to use the compelling interest
standard but in fact applying a balancing test. E.g., United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d
893, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1973) (sustaining airport security systems against constitutional
attack on grounds of privacy and right to travel); Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp.
492 (D.NJ. 1972). See generally Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Houle, Compelling State Interest vs.
Mere Rational Classification: The Practitioner's Equal Protection Dilemma, 3 URBAN
LAw. 375 (1971); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 H-Av. I. REv. 1065,
1076-78 (1969).
17. 394 U.S. at 627.
253
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subsistence to those who had recently exercised that right, the Court held
that the requirement would violate the equal protection clause unless
justified by a compelling state interest.' 8
The Shapiro approach has frequently been used to invalidate dura-
tional residence requirements.' Dunn v. Blumstein20 struck down du-
rational residence requirements for voter registration, the Court incor-
porating Justice Stewart's concurring statement in Shapiro that the right
to travel is an "unconditional personal right."'' 2 It held that the com-
pelling state interest test is "triggered" by any classification penalizing
the exercise of the right to travel;22 Shapiro did not require that travel be
deterred. In Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,23 the Court clari-
fied its analysis. First, it held that the right to travel involved in Shapiro
and its progeny was specifically the right "to migrate, resettle, find a new
job, and start a new life."' 24 Secondly, it implied that Dunn had used the
word "penalty" in a very narrow sense; it emphasized that a penalty on
the exercise of the constitutional right to travel had been found only in
cases involving denial of a fundamental political right or of the basic
necessities of life.2 5 The status of the law was narrowly stated:
,ITihe right of interstate travel must be seen as insuring new residents
the same right to vital governmental benefits and privileges in the States
to which they migrate as are enjoyed by other residents. 20
18. Id. at 634.
19. E.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (free medical
care); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (voting); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112 (1970) (voting); King v. Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971) (public
housing); Cole v. Housing Authority, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970) (public housing);
Barnes v. Board of Trustees, 369 F. Supp. 1327 (W.D. Mich. 1973) (veteran's benefits);
Carter v. Gallagher, 337 F. Supp. 626 (D. Minn. 1971) (veteran's employment prefer-
ence); Valenciano v. Bateman, 323 F. Supp. 600 (D. Ariz. 1971) (medical care);
Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (abortion); Vaughan v. Bower,
313 F. Supp. 37 (D. Ariz.), affd mem., 400 U.S. 884 (1970) (mental health care). But
see Sosna v. Iowa, 95 S. Ct. 553 (1975) (sustaining durational residence requirement
for filing divorce petition); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973) (dictum) (dura-
tional residence requirement for lower tuition at state university would be valid); cf. U.S.
CONsT. art. I, §§ 2, 3; id. art. 11, § 1 (durational residence required for eligibility to
hold political office).
20. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
21. 394 U.S. at 643, quoted in 405 U.S. at 341.
22. 405 U.S. at 339-41.
23. 415 U.S. at 250 (1974) (unconstitutional to require one year's residence in
county to qualify for nonemergency medical care at county expense).
24. 394 U.S. at 629, quoted in 415 U.S. at 255.
25. 415 U.S. at 258-59.
26. Id. at 261.
[Vol. 1975:250
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Some lower courts have used the Shapiro approach to evaluate the
constitutionality of municipal employee residence ordinances.17 Ap-
plied to persons already employed, such ordinances arguably create two
classes of municipal employees 28 distinguishable only on the basis of
exercise of the right to travel. Employees who migrate from city to sub-
urb are penalized by dismissal. Under this view, Shapiro dictates the
compelling state interest standard of review.
In Abrahams v. Civil Service Commission,29 appellant challenged a
residence ordinance that had been previously tested against the rational
basis standard and upheld.30 The court declined to adopt the compelling
state interest standard and distinguished Shapiro in two ways. First, Me-
morial Hospital was cited as limiting Shapiro to durational residence
requirements-residence as a precondition to employment.3' The New-
ark ordinance was a continuing residence requirement-residence as a
condition to continued employment. 2 To support this distinction, the
court relied on Detroit Police Officers Association v. City of Detroit,3"
which held continuous residence requirements for police constitutional
under a rational relationship test. Secondly, the court asserted that, un-
der Memorial Hospital, the right to travel was fundamental only with
27. E.g., Ector v. City of Torrance, 28 Cal. App. 3d 293, 104 Cal. Rptr. 594 (CL
App. 1972). rev'd, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1973), cert. de-
nied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974); Donnelly v. City of Manchester, 111 N.H. 50, 274 A.2d
789 (1971); cf. State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142 (Alas. 1973); Town of Milton v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, - Mass. -, 312 N.E.2d 188 (1974); Eggert v. City of Seattle, 81 Wash.
2d 840, 505 P.2d 801 (1973) (durational employee residence requirements). For a case
holding employee residence requirements constitutional under the compelling interest
standard, see Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972) (statute examined
only with respect to policemen and firemen).
28. (1) Residents, and (2) former residents who have moved out of the municipal-
ity.
29. 65 N.J. 61,319 A.2d 483 (1974).
30. Kennedy v. City of Newark, 29 N.J. 178, 148 A.2d 473 (1959); Mercadante
v. City of Paterson, 111 NJ. Super. 35, 266 A.2d 611 (Ch. 1970), aff'd, 58 N.J. 112,
275 A.2d 440 (1971). In Kennedy, Chief Justice Weintraub stated:
The question is not whether a man is free to live where he will. Rather the
question is whether he may live where he wishes and at the same time insist
upon employment by the government.
Supra at 183, 148 A.2d at 476, quoted in Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comn'n, 65 NJ. 61,
65, 319 A.2d 483, 485 (1974). For a discussion of the right-privilege argument that
this aphorism suggests see note 40 infra.
31. 65 N.J. at 68, 319 A.2d at 487.
32. Id. at 66, 319 A.2d at 486.
33. 405 U.S. 950 (1972), dismissing appeal from 385 Mich. 519, 190 N.W.2d 97
(1971 ) (no substantial federal question).
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respect to migration between states. The travel or migration of the ap-
pellant had been wholly within the state. Lower federal and state deci-
sions using the constitutional right to travel to protect intrastate move-
ment33 were rejected. 0 In the words of the majority, appellant asserted
not the right to travel, but "merely the common right to live where one
will.' 3 In applying the rational basis test, the court listed a number of
local policy interests that might be furthered by the ordinance. 8 Special
emphasis was placed on the city's interest in promoting employment of
its residents.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Pashman argued that there was suf-
ficient precedent to establish constitutional protection of intrastate
movement.39 He did not find the distinction between durational and
continuous residence requirements significant, since in his view the or-
dinance clearly penalized exercise of the right to travel.4 ° Concluding
that the compelling state interest standard was appropriate, he proceed-
ed to examine the various, rationales advanced to justify the ordinance
and found them "individually" and "collectively" insufficient.41
34. 65 N.J. at 70-71, 319 A.2d at 488.
35. E.g., King v. Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971); Cole v. Housing
Authority, 435 F.2d 807 '(1st Cir. 1970); Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492
(D.N.J. 1972); Donnelly v. City of Manchester, 111 N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971);
Josephine County School Dist. v. Oregon School Activities Ass'n, 15 Ore. App. 185,
515 P.2d 431 (1973); Eggert v. City of Seattle, 81 Wash. 2d 840, 505 P.2d 801 (1973);
ef. Karp v. Collins, 310 F. Supp. 627, 634 (D.N.J. 1970); In re Barcomb, 132 Vt. 225,
234, 315 A.2d 476, 482 (1974).
36. 65 NJ. at 71, 319 A.2d at 488.
37. Id. at 72, 319 A.2d at 488-89.
38. Id. at 72-73, 319 A.2d at 489. The interests are listed in note 5 supra.
39. Id. at 81-84, 319 A.2d at 494-95; see cases cited note 34 supra.
40. 65 N.J. at 93, 319 A.2d at 500:
The residence requirement... directly affects one's ability to "migrate with
intent to settle and abide,".... If one works for a local government, the
majority would allow the choice of where to settle to be made by the governing
body, and not the individual. Such restrictions pose a clear threat to migration
by causing a second dislocation when new arrivals or present employees find
government work in a jurisdiction adjacent to that in which they have decided
to settle.
41. Id. at 85-92, 319 A.2d at 496-99. The argument that residence ordinances re-
circulate tax money, (the "public coffer" argument) was rejected as a constitutionally
impermissible defense. Id. at 87-88, 319 A.2d at 497. The public coffer doctrine has
been examined by the Supreme Court in cases dealing with state restrictions on employ-
ment of aliens and held not to provide a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Sugarman
v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Leger v. Sailer, 321 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1970),
affd sub nom. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Purdy & Fitzpatrick v.
State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969). In Memorial Hospital
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The majority opinion is flawed by its reliance on ambiguous dicta.
According to the court, Memorial Hospital severely restricts the Shapiro
analysis to cases involving both interstate travel and durational residen-
cy. Memorial Hospital, however, struck down the challenged statute and
can easily be read to support a position contrary to that of the Abrahams
court.42 Likewise, the dismissal in Detroit Police Officers should not be
decisive. It was a me-morandum opinion dismissing an appeal without
argument "for want of a substantial federal question;" the case is readily
the Court said: "[A] State may not protect the public fise by drawing an invidious dis-
tinction between classes of its citizens. . . ." 415 U.S. at 263.
The idea that public employment, being a privilege rather than a right, could be con-
ditioned on failure to exercise a constitutional right (the "right-privilege" argument) was
similarly rejected by the Abrahams dissent as impermissible. 65 N.J. at 90-91, 319 A.2d
at 498-99. The right-privilege distinction was first articulated by then-Judge Holmes:
"The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitu-
tional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216,
220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892); see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Dis-
tinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968). The doctrine assumes
the point to be decided; it appears to have been totally rejected by the Supreme Court.
See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 643-44 (1973); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). See generally Van Alstyne, supra.
Justice Pashman found no relationship between a desire to reduce ghetto unemploy-
ment and a requirement that employees live in the city. "The reduction in unemploy-
ment among inner-city minority groups relates to those whom the city hires, and not
the requirement that employees live in the city." 65 NJ. at 88, 319 A.2d at 497; cf.
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). He agreed that the residence requirement
might be defensible if applied only to police or firemen. Significant advantages, includ-
ing better community relations and more available trained manpower in emergencies
(the "proximity" arguments), can result from assuring that members of these groups re-
side within the community they serve. No such advantage, however, would result from
applying the requirement to a stenographer. Cf. Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 .F. Supp.
492, 498-501 (D.N.J. 1972).
42. Memorial Hospital did not go beyond the factual setting of prior cases to strike
down the challenged statute, but was careful to leave that option open.
Whatever its ultimate scope, however, the right to travel was involved in only
a limited sense in Shapiro ....
.. . Even were we to draw a constitutional distinction between interstate
and intrastate travel, a question we do not now consider, such a distinction
would not support the judgment ....
Whatever the ultimate parameters of the Shapiro penalty analysis, it is at
least clear that medical care is as much "a basic necessity of life" to an indi-
gent as welfare assistance.
415 U.S. at 254-56, 259 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). The Court also discussed
the illogic of allowing a residence requirement to bar the employment of intrastate mi-
grants but holding it unconstitutional with regard to interstate migrants. Id. at 256 n.9.
257
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distinguished" and in any event ought to have limited value according
to conventional principles of stare decisis . 4 The court's assertion that
43. The dissent in Abrahams distinguished Detroit Police Officers by demonstrating
that the justifications for requiring police residence are more convincing than the justifi-
cations for requiring residence of all employees. 65 N.J. at 85-86 n.4, 319 A.2d at 496
n.4.
44. Two other courts have held the dismissal of Detroit Police Officers to be a bind-
ing decision on the merits of the question whether the compelling state interest test
should apply to employee residence requirements. Ahem v. Murphy, 457 F.2d 363 (7th
Cir. 1972); Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 433, 109 Cal. Rptr.
849 (1973) (alternative holding). It has been suggested that such a dismissal should
be considered as merely persuasive rather than binding. See Note, The Significance of
Dismissals "For Want of a Substantial Federal Question": Original Sin in the Federal
Courts, 68 COLUm. L. Rnv. 785, 790-92 (1968). One recent decision, in refusing to
be bound by a Supreme Court dismissal of the same claim "for want of a substantial
federal question" several years earlier, said: "The Supreme Court has on occasion dis-
missed a case on this ground only to deal with the same issue in subsequent appeals."
Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 501 (D. Minn. 1974). The court concluded that
"doctrinal developments" outweighed the dismissal. Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 670-71 (1974) (summary affirmance "not of the same precedential value as would
be an opinion of this court treating the question on the merits").
The Supreme Court rejected the less-than-binding-precedent approach in the 5-4
decision of Hicks v. Miranda, 95 S. CL 2281 (1975). In Hicks, the three-judge district
court held unconstitutional an obscenity statute previously upheld in the state courts
against constitutional attack. Appeal of the state court decision had been dismissed by
the Supreme Court for lack of a substantial federal question. Miller v. California, 418
U.S. 915 (1974). Holding that the dismissal precluded the district court from recon-
sidering the statute's constitutionality, the Court stated that "the lower courts are bound
by summary decisions by this Court 'until such time as the Court informs [them] that
[they] are not"' 95 S. Ct. at 2289, quoting Doe v. Hodgson, 478 F.2d 537, 539 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1096 (1974). Mr. Justice Clark has strongly criti-
cized the Hicks decision:
The Supreme Court's statements in Hicks v. Miranda. . . to the effect that such
dismissals are decisions "on the merits", seem to me to fly in the face of the
long-established practice of the Court at least during the eighteen Terms in
which I sat. During that time, appeals from state court decisions received
treatment similar to that accorded petitions for certiorari and were given about
the same precedential weight. An unquestioning application of the Hicks rule
can lead to nothing but mischief and place an unnecessary restraining hand on
the progress of federal constitutional adjudication.
Hogge v. Johnson, Civil No. 74-1656 (4th Cir., Aug. 19, 1975) (concurring opinion of
Justice Clark, retired, sitting by designation).
It is submitted, however, that regardless of the weight given such dismissals when they
are properly raised as precedent, Detroit Police Officers should not govern here. It is
an established requirement that "the claim of invalidity and the ground therefor be
brought to the attention of the state court with fair precision and in due time," before
the question will be heard by the Supreme Court. New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmer-
man, 278 U.S. 63, 67 (1928), quoted in C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL
CounTs § 107, at 486 (2d ed. 1970). Yet neither the majority nor the dissenting opin-
ions in Detroit Police Officers cited Shapiro or raised the question of whether the com-
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the right involved is "merely the right to live where one will" is also defi-
cient, for the same statement could be made about any of the right-to-
travel cases.
Nevertheless, the result in Abrahams seems to be sound. Application
of the compelling state interest test would require significant extension
of the Shapiro doctrine in three areas.45 First, the Supreme Court has
never decided that the fundamental right to travel protected by the Fed-
eral Constitution extends to movement entirely within a state. Though
recent dicta indicate that an intrastate right may exist,46 it is difficult to
defend that conclusion under any of the constitutional clauses from
which the right to travel was derived. 47 Second, it is not clear whether
pelling state interest standard was applicable. Also, the Supreme Court dismissal
should be relevant only to questions actually considered by the Court. Cf. David v.
New York Tel. Co., 470 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1972). The Supreme Court Rules limit the
questions that may be considered:
The statement of a question presented will be deemed to include every subsidi-
ary question fairly comprised therein. Only the questions set forth in the ju-
risdictional statement or fairly comprised therein will be considered by the
court.
Sup. Cr. R. 15-1(c) (1970) (emphasis added). In Detroit Police Officers, the appel-
lants asserted in their jurisdictional statement a right under the due process clause to
"live where one pleases while working for a local municipality." Brief for Appellants
at 8, Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 405 U.S. 950 (1972). The context
makes it clear that the appellants did not intend by this to present the Shapiro equal-
protection-denial-of-right-to-travel question. They did not cite Shapiro, and their equal
protection argument did not seek application of the compelling state interest standard.
Id. at 19-21. Since the question was not raised, it is unreasonable to consider the issue
to have been foreclosed. See Hicks v. Miranda, supra, 95 S. Ct. at 2290 n.14. See
generally C. Wmor, supra § 107, at 485-87; id. § 108, at 494-95.
45. Two definitional extensions would also be needed if the Court retained the term
"migration" to describe exercise of the constitutional right to travel. A holding that mi-
gration had taken place in Abrahams would mean that (1) migration occurs even when
the moving party remains so close to the original locality as to retain permanent employ-
ment there, and (2) migration refers to movement from a locality as well as movement
into a locality (the cases are limited to the latter type of movement).
46. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 256 n.9 (1974).
47. See note 11 supra. Descriptions of the right to travel as a fundamental personal
right suggest that the right extends intrastate. Cf. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 255
(1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958). Giving
the right to travel the same status as other "fundamental rights," such as fully incorpo-
rated first amendment rights, however, would bring into question an enormous range of
local and state governmental activity. Cf. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Peta-
luma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 581 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (land-use planning), noted in 1975
WASH. U.L.Q. 234. The Court ought to be reluctant to extend the doctrine unless it
has a firm constitutional basis; yet the cases establishing the right to travel speak only in
terms of interstate travel, and may restrict the right to such migration. But see Stirrup
v. Mahan, - Ind. App. -, 290 N.E.2d 64 (1972), modified, - Ind. App. -, 305
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the right can be infringed by continuous residence requirements. Shapi-
ro and its progeny all dealt with durational residency. As Justice Pash-
man pointed out, the logic of Shapiro would apply to any statutory classi-
fication based solely on the exercise of the-right to travel.48 The Supreme
Court, however, has applied the Shapiro analysis to durational residence
classifications only. The distinction is, too clear to be ignored. 49 Third,
it is not clear that loss of public employment constitutes a "penalty" in
the Memorial Hospital sense. This issue would probably be resolved in
the employee's favor, however, for the Court has recognized the impor-
tance of employment, even if never quite establishing it as a right." In
Memorial Hospital the Court found denial of nonemergency medical care
to be a penalty-but that denial would affect an individual's physical
well-being no more than dismissal from employment would affect his
economic well-being. The dissent is probably correct in its conclusion
that, if the compelling state interest test did apply, municipal resident
requirements would be struck down, as applied to most occupations,
for the rationales advanced for such ordinances cannot withstand more
than superficial analysis. 51
Abrahams demonstrates the continuing confusion in the case law
over whether Shapiro will be extended in accordance with its logic, or
limited by its facts. The Supreme Court should define the limits of Shapi-
N.E.2d 877 (1974). But cf. Note, Residence Requirements After Shapiro v. Thompson,
70 COLUM. L. REV. 134, 138-39 (1970); Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare,
and the Constitution, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 989, 998-99 (1969). Since the interstate right
is firmly established, to deny that intrastate travel is a fundamental right would result in
giving preference to interstate over intrastate migrants. Goldstein 522. A state court
may, however, interpret the state constitution to eliminate whatever inequities result.
Cf. State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142 (Alas. 1973).
48. 65 N.J. at 82-83, 319 A.2d at 495.
49. It is also possible that some continuous residence requirements would meet the
compelling interest test.
States have the power to require that voters be bona fide residents of the rele-
vant political subdivision.,. . . An appropriately defined and uniformly ap-
plied requirement of bona fide residence may be necessary to preserve the basic
conception of a political community, and therefore could withstand close con-
stitutional scrutiny. But durational residence requirements, representing a sep-
arate voting qualification imposed on bona fide residents, must be separately
tested by the stringent standard.
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1972) (emphasis original, footnotes omitted).
50. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33 (1915); note 40 supra (discussion of "public coffer" argument). But see Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1969).
1 51. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
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ro in nondurational residence cases. Until it does so, cases like Abra-
hams indicate that the right to travel will not be converted into a right to
commute. 52
52. Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal. 3d 129, 514 P.2d 443, 109 Cal. Rptr. 849
(1973). But see Goldstein 535; cf. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375
F. Supp. 574, 581 (1974), noted in 1975 WsH. U.L.Q. 234.
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